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1969 
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies 
Roger D. Blair  & D. Daniel Sokol  
ABSTRACT: The appropriate role of merger efficiencies remains unresolved 
in United States antitrust law and policy. The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) has led to a significant shift in health care 
delivery. The ACA promises that increased integration and a shift from 
quantity of performance to increased competition will create a system in which 
quality of health care will go up and prices will go down. Increasingly, due 
to the economic trends that respond to the ACA, including considerable 
consolidation both horizontally and vertically, it is imperative that the 
antitrust agencies provide an economically sound and administrable legal 
approach to efficiency-enhancing mergers. In this regard, horizontal hospital 
mergers present particular challenges for antitrust. Most hospital merger cases 
focus on cost-based efficiencies, as does most of the academic empirical 
literature. Yet, government policy seems out of sync with quality-enhancing 
efficiencies analysis. This Essay first provides a discussion of the welfare 
effects on quality and its implications for antitrust analysis. Then, the Essay 
explores quality-enhancing efficiencies analysis in both the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines and in antitrust case law. In doing so, the Essay identifies 
areas of both clarity and ambiguity regarding quality-enhancing efficiencies 
policy. Third, the Essay draws parallels to an efficiency analysis of quality 
under rule of reason analysis, in which the Essay offers examples of resale 
price maintenance and tying of franchising contracts. Thereafter, the Essay 
addresses how agencies and courts should treat quality-enhancing efficiencies 
in mergers. In doing so, the Essay draws upon the existing academic literature 
in empirical industrial organization economics and public health on 
measurements of what is hospital quality in a consolidating health care 
marketplace. In its concluding section, the Essay advocates a more robust use 
of quality measurements as a guiding principle of merger law and policy that 
(1) is flexible enough for case by case analysis; (2) will provide for ease of 
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administrability; and (3) will make outcomes fall more in line with sound 
economic analysis than the current system. 
 I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1970 
 II. WELFARE EFFECTS OF QUALITY ................................................... 1975 
A. BASIC ANALYSIS .................................................................... 1975 
B. QUALITY EFFICIENCIES UNDER THE MERGER GUIDELINES AND CASE 
LAW ..................................................................................... 1979 
C. QUALITY ENHANCING EFFICIENCIES UNDER A RULE OF REASON 
ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 1984 
1. Resale Price Maintenance ........................................... 1985 
2. Promotional Uses of RPM .......................................... 1986 
3. Tying ............................................................................ 1989 
 III. HOW TO TREAT QUALITY-ENHANCING EFFICIENCIES IN 
MERGERS ..................................................................................... 1991 
 IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 1995 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The role of merger efficiencies remains unresolved in U.S. antitrust law 
and policy.1 Within the world of merger efficiencies, the antitrust agencies 
and courts have spent less effort in analyzing and developing workable legal 
rules with regard to quality-enhancing efficiencies vis-à-vis cost-reducing 
efficiencies. As this Essay explains, agencies and courts offer greater weight to 
price than quality efficiencies. In some cases this does not affect the outcome 
of a case. Indeed, only a small number of litigated cases or matters before the 
agencies have been decided on efficiency grounds.2 Among cases in which 
efficiencies matter, a merger in which there are no cost efficiencies also may 
be a situation in which there are no quality efficiencies. Nevertheless, 
 
 1. See generally Roger D. Blair & Jessica S. Haynes, The Efficiencies Defense in the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57, 57–68 (2011); Hillary Greene & D. Daniel 
Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2039 (2015); Howard Shelanski, 
Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST  ECONOMICS 451 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015); D. Daniel Sokol & 
James A. Fishkin, Response: Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 45, 46 (2011) (“discussing the actual practice of merger efficiencies and the underlying 
scholarly work in the area”).  
 2. For litigated cases, see infra note 29. For agency matters, see generally MALCOLM B. 
COATE & ANDREW J. HEIMERT, FED. TRADE COMM’N, ECONOMIC ISSUES: MERGER EFFICIENCIES AT 
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1997–2007 (2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/reports/merger-efficiencies-federal-trade-commission-1997%E2%80 
%932007/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf.  
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sometimes there may be situations in which the quality-enhancing efficiencies 
may be substantial, even while the cost-reducing efficiencies may not be. Such 
mergers should be allowed to proceed. By providing greater weight to cost 
efficiencies at the expense of quality enhancing efficiencies, antitrust policy 
creates market distortions. Ignoring changes in quality or underemphasizing 
such changes “in a merger analysis can lead to a bias in estimated welfare 
effects” of mergers and to mistaken outcomes.3 
By creating a false distinction between price and quality efficiencies, 
antitrust merger policy is out of step with antitrust policy in the area of 
conduct. The fundamental question, for example, regarding occupational 
licenses, such as in California Dental, is the price-versus-quality question and 
the desire for quality assurance.4 The same can be said in Leegin about Resale 
Price Maintenance (“RPM”) both in the free rider and non-free-rider 
contexts.5 This Essay seeks to provide some guidance on how to create an 
administrable system for measuring quality-enhancing efficiencies. 
Upon first glance, costs seem easier to measure than quality factors. 
Unlike price, where lower price is the single dimension (assuming one 
product), quality may have multiple dimensions. However, such reasoning is 
deceptively easy and misguided. Even in a pricing context, cost is not always 
easy to determine. A multi-product discount can mean that price may be 
higher for one product but the entire bundle would be cheaper.6 Limiting 
oneself only to price, there are multiple ways to determine the appropriate 
cost-based tests in the context of single-firm conduct.7 In this sense, the 
overriding concern of administrability regarding quality measurement seems 
out of place as price/cost tests may be equally difficult for courts to figure out 
as quality measurement. 
Quality issues remain critical to antitrust merger analysis. The purpose of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act is to prevent mergers that create monopolies or 
 
 3. See, e.g., Ying Fan, Ownership Consolidation and Product Characteristics: A Study of the US Daily 
Newspaper Market, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1598, 1598 (2013). 
 4. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 762, 771–78 (1999). 
 5. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–92 (2007). 
 6. This is not the issue that is the focus of our Essay. We note however that a number of 
litigated cases have addressed this issue. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 
272–81 (3d Cir. 2012); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903–11 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. Mayer Labs., Inc., No. C-10-4429 EMC, 2011 WL 
1225912, at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011). 
 7. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary 
Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 387–89 (2006); Kevin M. Murphy 
et al., Competitive Discounts and Antitrust Policy, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 89, 92–93 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015); Gregory J. 
Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 413, 418–20 (2006). 
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oligopolies.8 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“2010 Merger 
Guidelines”) express this concern specific to quality-enhancing efficiencies, 
noting that “purported efficiency claims based on lower prices can be 
undermined if they rest on reductions in product quality or variety that 
customers value.”9 That is, quality degradation, if it results in lower cost, is not 
to be supported under efficiencies analysis. When both costs and quality 
efficiencies increase, however, the 2010 Merger Guidelines are silent. They 
contemplate only situations in which “[e]fficiencies also may lead to new or 
improved products, even if they do not immediately and directly affect 
price.”10 Increased quality may also impact mergers where there is no price 
decrease or where prices go up post-merger. 
Understanding quality efficiencies is especially important today, after the 
increased merger activity that has resulted from the passage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).11 The ACA promises that 
increased integration and a shift from quantity to quality performance 
through increased competition will create a system in which quality will go up 
and prices will go down.12 Increasingly, due to the economic trends that 
respond to the ACA, including considerable consolidation both horizontally 
and vertically, it is imperative that the antitrust agencies provide an 
economically sound and administrable legal approach to efficiency-
enhancing mergers.13 
Quality is particularly important as an issue that has emerged in the rapid 
consolidation in health care, particularly among hospital mergers. Most 
 
 8. See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012 & Supp. I 2013); 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND 
THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 901b2, at 8–10 (rev. ed. 1998). 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 31 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. 
 10. See id. at 29. 
 11. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (codified in scattered sections of 20–21, 25–26, 42 U.S.C.). 
 12. Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”) are one attempt to create such efficiencies 
based on integration short of a merger. See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: 
Accountable Care Organizations and Competition Policy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3–7 (2014).  
 13. Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust, Accountable Care Organizations, 
and the Promise of Health Care Reform, Keynote Address at the 11th Annual Loyola Antitrust 
Colloquium 2 (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
public_statements/antitrust-accountable-care-organizations-and-promise-health-care-reform/1104 
29loyolaspeech.pdf (“Antitrust enforcers recognize that provider collaboration represents an 
innovative way to seek to lower healthcare costs and improve the quality of care. We of course do 
not want to stand in the way of those goals. At the same time, we want to ensure that the financial 
savings and improved patient outcomes that could result from these collaborative efforts are not lost 
because of increased provider concentration and coordination.” (citation omitted)). See generally 
Kristin Madison, Hospital Mergers in an Era of Quality Improvement, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265 
(2007). 
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hospital merger cases focus on cost-based efficiencies, as does most of the 
academic empirical literature.14 Yet, government policy seems out of sync with 
quality analysis. Last year, the then-head of the hospital merger group of the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) stated how the agency viewed quality of 
care: 
[T]hough quality of care experts may play an important role in 
hospital merger cases, their role generally is limited to reviewing the 
case-specific evidence and explaining its implications to the judge; 
testimony that hospital mergers (or some subset thereof) generally 
have a positive or negative impact on quality is suspect. Thus, just as 
with other defenses, quality-related claims in hospital merger 
matters often turn on ordinary course documents, executive 
testimony, and other case-specific evidence.15 
If one made such claims that cost effects should focus on ordinary course 
documents rather than as part of a rigorous econometric analysis, 
practitioners and academics in the field would not consider those as part of 
the true economic-effects-data-driven practice that is the standard in antitrust 
merger analysis.16 Economic analysis- and effects-based antitrust, including 
econometric analysis, is the basis for both agency decisionmaking and court 
analysis regarding competitive effects.17 
 
 14. See, e.g., David Dranove & Richard Lindrooth, Hospital Consolidation and Costs: Another 
Look at the Evidence, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 983 (2003). Because quality is an important part of 
competition in hospital services, we cannot entirely rule out that price increases are not so much 
a reflection of market power but a change in the quality improvements. 
 15. Jeffrey H. Perry & Richard H. Cunningham, Effective Defenses of Hospital Mergers in 
Concentrated Markets, ANTITRUST, Spring 2013, at 43. Notably, the same article exclusively 
addresses its discussion of efficiencies in the cost context. 
 16. See generally 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 
(Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015). The lack of significant focus by courts on 
qualitative factors for quality of care seems to show no change from earlier cases. See Peter J. 
Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 
636–37 (2002). 
 17. See generally Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of the Areeda–Hovenkamp Treatise in 
the Lower Courts and What It Means for Institutional Reform in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1919(2015); 
Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, Licensing Health Care Professionals, State Action and 
Antitrust Policy, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1943 (2015); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Not Treble 
Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1997 (2015); 
Daniel A. Crane, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I Learned in 1912, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
2025(2015); Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 2069 (2015); William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, The Federal Trade Commission as an 
Independent Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2085 (2015); Mark A. 
Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
2115(2015); Christopher  R. Leslie, The Commerce Requirement in Tying Law, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
2135 (2015); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An Essay 
for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2161 (2015); Barak Orbach, The Durability of Formalism 
in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2197 (2015); Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, Promoting 
Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2223 (2015). For the role of economics in antitrust, see generally 
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More recently, the current head of the FTC Bureau of Competition, 
Deborah Feinstein, stated: 
     In assessing quality arguments, we examine a variety of evidence. 
We look at the comparative quality of the hospitals merging. If the 
acquired hospital already has strong quality measurements 
comparable to those of the acquiring hospital, we may question the 
ability of the acquiring hospital to improve those metrics. If the 
acquiring hospital has made prior acquisitions, we will want to see 
whether those mergers resulted in quality improvements. The 
parties must explain more than just the processes and practices that 
the acquiring hospital system can transfer to an additional hospital; 
they need to address the specifics of how those processes and 
practices will benefit patients through improved care.18 
On the whole, her policy goals are sensible. However, Feinstein does not 
provide guidance as to which quality measurements matter more than others. 
She also does not provide any guidance on how to interpret quality 
measurements in a comparable way to price efficiencies. 
The lack of guidance has important policy implications for mergers 
generally and health care mergers in particular. Without an economically 
sensible approach that can provide certainty as to when and how to structure 
potential quality enhancing mergers, businesses will be unable to identify 
mergers that enhance quality and are less likely to violate antitrust law. Equally 
important, the St. Luke’s merger lost on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, in which the Ninth Circuit recently placed a nearly 
impossible burden on the merging parties to prove quality-enhancing 
efficiencies.19  As other merger cases continue to be litigated, the meaning of 
efficiencies in merger cases remains an open question. 
 
Lawrence J. White, Economics, Economists, and Antitrust: A Tale of Growing Influence, in BETTER 
LIVING THROUGH ECONOMICS 226 (John J. Siegfried ed., 2010). For case law analysis, see Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1088–90 (D.D.C. 1997). Staples started this 
trend. Because agencies want to win cases, they use ordinary course business documents to help 
shape a story. There may be overreach with regard to such documents when they take on a life 
on their own and drive the courts, rather than the economic effects. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *19–20 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014); 
United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 52–54 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 18. Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir. Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust 
Enforcement in Health Care: Proscription, Not Prescription 11 (June 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/409481/140619_aco_speech.
pdf. More recently Feinstein has suggested that the best case for hospitals to prove quality is if 
they have a track record of quality improvements in previous mergers. A Discussion with Director of 
the Bureau of Competition at the FTC Deborah L. Feinstein, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Oct. 
2014, at 6. Of course, this would be a problem for a hospital that has never been involved in a 
merger before. 
 19. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 793 
(9th Cir. 2015); see Brief for Amici Curiae International Center of Law & Economics & Medicaid 
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This Essay proceeds as follows. First, it provides a discussion of the welfare 
effects on quality and its implications for antitrust analysis. The Essay then 
explores quality analysis both in the 2010 Merger Guidelines and in antitrust 
case law. In doing so, the Essay identifies areas both of clarity and ambiguity 
regarding quality-enhancing efficiencies policy. The Essay then draws 
parallels to an efficiency analysis of quality under rule of reason analysis, in 
which the Essay offers examples of RPM and tying of franchising contracts. 
Thereafter, the Essay addresses how agencies and courts should treat quality 
efficiencies in mergers. In doing so, the Essay draws upon the existing 
academic literature in empirical industrial organization economics and 
public health on measurements of what is hospital quality in a consolidating 
health care marketplace. The Essay concludes by advocating for a more robust 
use of quality measurements as a guiding principle of merger law and policy, 
that is flexible enough for case-by-case analysis and that will provide for ease 
of administrability and better outcomes than the current system. It also 
suggests the need for an updated Commentary of the Merger Guidelines that 
explains what types of quality measurements are better than others in general 
and for certain industries. 
II. WELFARE EFFECTS OF QUALITY 
A. BASIC ANALYSIS 
Some mergers may improve the quality of the merged firm’s output.20 
Any improved quality must be a result of the merger for the courts or antitrust 
enforcers to recognize the efficiencies of the merger. Any quality 
improvements that are not a direct result of the specific merger will not be 
recognized.21 If the quality change can be realized without the consolidation, 
then the quality change will not offset any reduction in competition.22 
Consequently, in what follows, the quality changes are assumed to be merger 
specific, i.e., the quality improvement is a product of the merger and cannot 
be realized without the merger. 
Consumers prefer higher-quality over lower-quality goods and services. 
Thus, when quality improves, consumers are willing to pay more for the same 
quantity of the good. Initially, assume that improved quality leads to a parallel 
shift in demand for the good. The effect on consumer welfare is ambiguous. 
In fact, consumer surplus may rise, fall, or stay the same depending on what 
happens to price. 
 
Defense Fund in Support of Defendants-Appellants Urging Reversal at 21, Saint Alphonsus Med. 
Ctr.–Nampa Inc., 778 F.3d 775, 2014 WL 2958116 at *21. 
 20. Quality is a general term that acquires meaning in specific context. It may refer to 
durability, fit and finish, style, color fastness, taste, texture, freedom from defects, and the like.  
 21. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 29–30. 
 22. Id. 
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In Figure 1, D1 represents the demand for a company’s products or 
services before the merger and the corresponding quality improvement. The 
supply is not restricted by the marginal cost (“MC”). The pre-merger price 
and quantity are P1 and Q1, respectively. Following the merger, quality of the 
output improves and demand shifts to D2. If the price, after the merger, rises 
to P2, quantity will not change. In other words, none of the quality change is 
“passed on” so to speak. In this case, consumer surplus will be unchanged. 
Prior to the merger, consumer surplus was equal to the triangular area abP1. 
Following the merger, consumer surplus is equal to the area of cdP2. The area 
represented by abP1 and cdP2 are precisely the same size. To be sure, the 
enhanced market power leads to some allocative inefficiency, because 
consumer surplus would rise to the area represented by ceP1 if the merger 
produced the quality improvement without enhancing market power. But this 
is not the relevant comparison, because the quality improvement and the 
enhanced market power are inextricably intertwined (by assumption). On 
economic grounds, therefore, there is no reason to approve or disapprove the 
merger. 
 
Figure 1 
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 In Figure 2, D1, D2, and MC from Figure 1 have been reproduced. In this 
case, however, assume that the increased market power leads to a price 
increase to P2, which leads to an increase in the quantity purchased. As long 
as quantity increases beyond Q1, consumer surplus will rise. The pre-merger 
consumer surplus is again equal to the area abP1. The post-merger consumer 
surplus is equal to area cdP2, which is larger than abP1. If the merger is 
accompanied by an increase in market power, there will be some allocative 
inefficiency, but this is not relevant for antitrust policy purposes. What is 
important is that consumer surplus rises with the merger. On economic 
grounds, therefore, this merger should be applauded. 
 
Figure 2 
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 In Figure 3, the merger enhances both quality and market power. Price 
rises to P2 and quantity falls to Q2. In this case, consumer surplus necessarily 
falls. The pre-merger consumer surplus is, of course, area abP1. The post-
merger consumer surplus is area cdP2, which is smaller than area abP1. Without 
more, this merger should not be approved on welfare grounds. 
In these three cases, the quality improvement associated with the merger 
led to the same shift in demand, but the welfare changes were driven by the 
extent of the increase in market power. No legitimate inferences can be drawn 
from the fact that the post-merger price rose. In the case of a parallel shift in 
demand, it is the quantity change that drives the welfare result. Thus, it is 
tempting to use a quantity test. If the post-merger quantity will be higher, then 
the merger will improve consumer welfare. If the post-merger quantity will be 
lower, then the welfare effect will be negative. But analysts should avoid such 
a quantity analysis since it will not necessarily shed light on what happens to 
consumer welfare. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
A4_BLAIR & SOKOL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2015  7:19 AM 
2015] QUALITY-ENHANCING MERGER EFFICIENCIES 1979 
 Consider Figure 4. In this case, the improved quality causes D1 to rotate 
to D3, which has been drawn so it intersects D2 at the point defined by P2 and 
Q2. Now, the relevant comparison is between the pre-merger consumer 
surplus of abP1 and the post-merger consumer surplus of cdP2, which may well 
be larger than abP1. Thus, there is no easy test unless one knows that the 
demand shift is parallel. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These examples illustrate how changes in quality may lead to different 
competitive outcomes. The next section explores how theories of quality 
enhancing efficiencies are implemented in antitrust policy. 
B. QUALITY EFFICIENCIES UNDER THE MERGER GUIDELINES AND CASE LAW 
The guiding principles of merger policy in the United States are found 
within the various iterations of Horizontal Merger Guidelines.23 Though the 
first Merger Guidelines appeared in 1968, they began to take hold more 
rapidly in the 1980s when the 1982 and 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
were created, and in the 1990s when the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
were also created and then revised in 1997 in the courts.24 More specific to 
the discussion of merger efficiencies, an efficiencies section was added to the 
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1997.25 Very little was changed in the 
 
 23. See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1055, 1105–09 (2010) (providing a brief history of the merger guidelines). 
 24. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust 
Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 781, 786, 803 & n.117 (2006). See generally Greene & Sokol, 
supra note 1. 
 25. See William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 232 (2003) (“[T]he 
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efficiencies analysis between the 1992 Merger Guidelines that were revised in 
1997 (“1992/97 Merger Guidelines”) and the 2010 Merger Guidelines.26 
The 2010 Merger Guidelines explain that “[c]ognizable efficiencies are 
merger-specific efficiencies that have been verified and do not arise from 
anticompetitive reductions in output or service.”27 Courts have cited to this 
language in decisions that utilize the 2010 Merger Guidelines.28 More 
generally, as with the previous 1992/97 Merger Guidelines, the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines have been accepted by courts to guide case law.29 
It is also important to note that the 2010 Merger Guidelines also impact 
what occurs in the shadow of the law before the agencies as they “will make a 
difference . . . in connection with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”30 
Additionally, the agencies’ 2006 Commentary on the Merger Guidelines 
provides a comprehensive summary up to that time of the issuance of the 
Commentary when agencies apply efficiencies to merger cases.31 Most of the 
examples provided in the Commentary focus on price efficiencies. 
The reason that agency guidance is so important in the area of merger 
efficiencies generally and quality efficiencies in particular is that no court has 
yet held that a challenged merger possesses efficiencies that are sufficient to 
overcome potential anticompetitive effects of a merger. Indeed, most merger 
cases have only a short discussion of efficiencies. 
Some decided cases have discussed quality efficiencies. Before 
undertaking a descriptive analysis of those cases, it is first crucial to note that 
decided cases suffer from a selection bias.32 Litigated cases will tend to be cases 
 
courts have largely adopted the analytical framework for evaluating efficiency claims that is set 
out in the Guidelines.”).  
 26. One limitation to the 2010 Merger Guidelines (and its predecessors) is that they are 
not statute and not case law. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1 (“[The Guidelines] 
may also assist the courts in developing an appropriate framework for interpreting and applying 
the antitrust laws in the horizontal merger context.”). However, they help guide case law. Sokol 
& Fishkin, supra note 1, at 53–54. This is particularly true given that the Supreme Court has not 
provided substantive guidance on mergers since the 1970s. See generally United States v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
 27. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 30.  
 28. United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011).  
 29. See id. See generally ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559 (6th 
Cir. 2014); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 1:12-CV-
00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014); United States v. 
Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Lab. Corp. of Am., No. SACV 10-1873 AG (MLGx), 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011).  
 30. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
485, 485 (1999). 
 31. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES 49–59 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
215247.pdf. 
 32. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 1–2 (1984). 
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that are close.33 As a result, the easy efficiency cases may not be seen in court. 
Further, most of the time there is a correlation between quality and price 
effects regarding efficiencies versus anticompetitive effect.34 Sometimes that 
may not be the case.35 There has yet to be a decided case in which the quality-
enhancing efficiencies were in contrast to price based anticompetitive effects 
as a result of the same merger. 
The types of cases in which efficiency claims may be accepted by the 
courts therefore do not get litigated. However, because the white papers that 
the merging parties provide the agencies are confidential, we simply do not 
see the very best cases regarding efficiencies. Instead, these transactions 
simply receive approval. 
A number of efficiency claims have been litigated in court since the 
establishment of the 1992/97 Merger Guidelines.36 Not all efficiency claims 
address quality claims. In fact, quality arguments are less common in litigated 
cases than price-related efficiencies. Nevertheless, some case law has 
developed to suggest how courts address the issue of quality efficiencies. 
The one case in which the question of efficiencies was significantly 
analyzed was in the baby foods merger between Heinz and Beech–Nut, which 
would have led to a market with the dominant player Gerber and the 
combined Heinz/Beech–Nut.37 Supermarkets always carried Gerber but 
almost always carried only one of Heinz or Beech–Nut. The merging parties 
claimed efficiencies on both price (due primarily to shuttering an antiquated 
factory in upstate New York) and quality (based on Beech–Nut’s superior-
tasting baby food). In deciding whether the merger violated antitrust law, the 
 
 33. Robert Pitofsky, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Panel Discussion at the Dep’t 
of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n Merger Workshop: Efficiencies/Dynamic Analysis/Integrated 
Analysis 82–83 (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ 
docs/40219ftc.pdf (“[T]here was a comment that courts almost never say [a merger is] illegal, 
but because of the efficiencies, I’ll make it—I’ll call it legal. I believe the reason for that is the 
agency doesn’t bring cases that are barely illegal but with substantial efficiencies. And therefore, 
the courts haven’t had a shot at this, and I’m not sure they’re going to get a shot very soon, 
because the agencies are very sensitive to claims of efficiency.”); see also George S. Cary, Cleary 
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Testimony to the Antitrust Modernization Commission: 
Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: From Both Sides Now 16 (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://gov 
info.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Cary_final.pdf (“[T]he government 
will rarely litigate cases in the absence of fairly clear evidence of a likely anticompetitive effect that would 
be difficult to overcome with efficiencies in any event.”).  
 34. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, HOW HAS HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE 
PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 8 (2006), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/ 
farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/rwjf12056/subassets/rwjf12056_1 (showing mixed results but 
the studies with strongest results of hospital consolidation show a decline in quality of care). 
 35. Mark V. Pauly, The Trade-Off Among Quality, Quantity, and Cost: How to Make It—If We 
Must, 30 HEALTH AFF. 574, 578 (2011) (“[E]ven to imply that quality could be lower in some 
aspects—and that lower quality at lower price could be desirable—is challenging in health care 
because that idea has been taboo for so long.”). 
 36. See generally Greene & Sokol, supra note 1. 
 37. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia articulated that the 
merging parties did not meet the threshold for a successful efficiencies claim 
under the 1992/97 Merger Guidelines. However, the D.C. Circuit, after 
noting the qualitative-enhancing efficiency argument, ignored the quality 
efficiencies and focused its analysis exclusively on the price efficiencies in its 
decision and it reversed the district court and found for the FTC.38 
The D.C. Circuit noted that “the high market concentration levels 
present in this case require, in rebuttal, proof of extraordinary efficiencies, which 
the appellees failed to supply,”39 whereas the district court credited the quality 
efficiencies in terms of the flavor of the baby food.40 What extraordinary 
means in either cost or quality contexts remains unclear in court decisions 
since Heinz. Though neither the words “econometric” nor “quantitative” are 
explicitly mentioned in the decision, cases involving efficiencies since Heinz 
have a quantitative element to them. 
Other cases that predate the 2010 Merger Guidelines discussed quality-
enhancing efficiencies, but in a more limited way. The other pre-2010 Merger 
Guidelines cases that addressed quality efficiencies have been hospital cases. 
In the Butterworth merger of two Grand Rapids, Michigan, hospitals, the court 
was convinced by Butterworth’s pledge to “serve all members of the 
community, without regard to ability to pay.”41 Without much discussion 
(relative to discussions on cost-based efficiencies), it also noted “[w]hile both 
hospitals are presently well-maintained, there is no question that the physical 
limitations of the Blodgett site significantly hinder Blodgett’s ability to 
continue to successfully compete with Butterworth and attract the best 
qualified physicians as medical services and technology continue to evolve.”42 
Similarly, in Long Island Jewish Medical Center, a merger between Long Island 
Jewish Medical Center and North Shore Health Systems, Inc., the court 
allowed the merger to be consummated based in part because the non-profit 
hospital mission was “to provide high quality health care to economically 
disadvantaged and elderly members of the community.”43 
 
 38. Id. at 721–22. A later FTC merger retrospective suggests that the FTC erred in blocking 
the deal. See generally Viola Chen, The Evolution of the Baby Food Industry: 2000–2008 (Bureau of 
Econs., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 297, 2009). 
 39. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 720 (emphasis added).  
 40. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz, Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199 (D.D.C. 2000) (“The 
Commission does not seriously dispute the proposition that the merger will result in better 
recipes for former Heinz buyers and value pricing for former Beech–Nut buyers.”). The appellate 
court further explained that “given the high concentration levels, the court must undertake a 
rigorous analysis of the kinds of efficiencies being urged by the parties in order to ensure that 
those ‘efficiencies’ represent more than mere speculation and promises about post-merger 
behavior.” Heinz, 246 F.3d at 721. 
 41. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1306 (W.D. Mich. 
1996), aff’d, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997). 
 42. Id. at 1301. 
 43. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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In FTC v. Tenet Health, a case involving the merger of two hospitals in 
Poplar Bluff, Missouri, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit took 
the lower court to task for not sufficiently analyzing the quality claim, noting 
“[t]he reality of the situation in our changing health care environment may 
be that Poplar Bluff cannot support two high-quality hospitals.”44 The Eighth 
Circuit also admonished the lower court for placing “an inordinate emphasis 
on price competition.”45 
Quality improvements alone, however, do not seem to warrant 
procompetitive treatment. In FTC v. Evanston Northwestern/Highland Park, a 
merger between two suburban Chicago area hospitals, the Commission found 
for the FTC because the quality improvements did not result from merger-
specific savings and that these quality improvements did not explain the post-
merger price increases.46 The FTC remedy in Evanston suggests that the 
Commission found some merit to the quality claims. While complaint counsel 
wanted a full divestiture, the Commission chose a remedy short of structural 
separation because of the quality improvement in cardiac surgery at Highland 
Park, which would not have had the volume of patients without the merger to 
sustain this improvement.47 
Since the introduction of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, a number of cases 
have explored, although briefly, how quality-enhancing efficiencies may play 
out in the merger context. In FTC v. Rockford/OSF, a three-to-two hospital 
merger in Rockford, Illinois, the merging parties claimed efficiencies based 
on best practices related to clinical effectiveness. The court was skeptical of 
such claims and believed that reaching greater clinical effectiveness was 
possible outside of the merger context.48 Similarly, the court rejected quality-
based efficiency arguments based on “Centers of Excellence”—wherein the 
combined hospitals could use such “Centers” to recruit specialists—as too 
speculative as outcomes that might be realized without a merger.49 
In the St. Luke’s Hospital acquisition of the Saltzer physician group, the 
parties made a series of unsuccessful claims regarding quality efficiencies 
before the district court. The parties argued that the primary reason for the 
merger was to eliminate the fee-for-service pay system and to move to a risk-
based integrated delivery system.50 On the one hand, the court was 
 
 44. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 45. Id. at 1054. 
 46. In re Evanston N.W. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2007 WL 2286195, at *59–60 (F.T.C. 
Aug. 6, 2007) (Opinion of the Commission). 
 47. In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, at 9 (F.T.C. Apr. 24, 2008) (Opinion 
of the Commission on Remedy), available at www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/ 
2008/04/080428commopiniononremedy.pdf. 
 48. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1092–93 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 49. Id. at 1093–94. 
 50. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 1:12-CV-
00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, ¶¶ 161–77 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014). 
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sympathetic to the merging parties for understanding the importance of 
vertical integration to improve quality.51 On the other hand, the court found 
that some of the efficiencies, such as number of doctors employed by the 
hospital, was not linked to the merger52 and that other ways to achieve 
integration-related efficiencies were possible.53 On the issue of electronic 
records, the court found that implementation of the Epic system did not 
require a merger and hence these efficiencies did not count as merger-
specific.54 The Circuit court agreed.55 
In United States v. Bazaarvoice, the merging parties claimed quality 
efficiencies based on more data that would be available for data analytics. 56  
The district court found that the efficiencies were not verifiable and therefore 
not merger-specific and that sharing of data short of the merger could have 
accomplished the same ends.57 
Overall, this descriptive analysis demonstrates that courts have not 
provided sufficient weight to quality efficiencies as they should and have not 
sufficiently articulated what sort of quality-enhancing efficiencies based on 
empirical data are more persuasive. Without using the same substantive 
standard for evidence as between price and quality efficiencies, courts may 
rule that procompetitive effects in a merger due to increased quality of care 
would not be sufficient to overcome a merger challenge. 
C. QUALITY ENHANCING EFFICIENCIES UNDER A RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS 
Federal courts have the institutional capability to undertake quality-based 
efficiency-enhancing analysis. We provide two examples—RPM and tying in 
franchising contracts—to illustrate how courts have been able to correctly 
adjudicate quality issues. Such adjudication is particularly relevant in the 
merger context where an increasing number of challenged mergers in recent 
years have been post-consummated mergers. These opinions, therefore, 
resemble a rule of reason analysis. These two examples suggest that merger 
courts (and agencies) would be well-served to undertake a more rigorous 
analytical approach to quality-enhancing merger efficiencies. 
 
 51. Id. at *1 (“St. Luke’s saw this major shift coming some time ago. And they are to be 
complimented on their foresight and vision. They started purchasing independent physician 
groups to assemble a team committed to practicing integrated medicine in a system where 
compensation depended on patient outcomes.”). 
 52. Id. ¶ 185 (“[A] committed team can be assembled without employing physicians . . . .”). 
 53. See id. ¶¶ 161–77. 
 54. Id. ¶ 204. 
 55. See supra note 21. 
 56. United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, ¶¶ 80–88 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
 57. Id. ¶ 315. 
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1. Resale Price Maintenance 
RPM is a business practice that restrains the pricing decisions of resellers. 
In its classic form, a manufacturer sells its product to its distributers on the 
condition that they not resell that product below a specific price. Thus, RPM 
puts a floor under the distributer’s price to their customers. This practice was 
found to be illegal per se in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., a 
1911 Supreme Court decision.58  After nearly 100 years, the Supreme Court 
overturned Dr. Miles in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.59 The 
weight of scholarly research revealed that RPM was neither invariably 
anticompetitive nor invariably procompetitive.60 Consequently, a rule of 
reason analysis seemed necessary to determine whether a particular instance 
of RPM was lawful or unlawful. After Leegin, a rule of reason analysis is now 
required. 
RPM can be used to facilitate a horizontal conspiracy among 
manufacturers, among distributers, or both.61 These situations are 
undesirable and manufacturers and distributers should avoid them. As price 
rises and quantity falls, both consumer welfare and social welfare are reduced. 
Without some colorable claim of enhanced efficiency, the practice will have 
no redeeming virtue and will fail a rule of reason test. But the existence of an 
 
 58. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 392 (1911). This decision 
received a good deal of scholarly criticism that began long ago. For an account of the early 
reactions, see generally William Breit, Resale Price Maintenance: What Do Economists Know and When 
Did They Know It?, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 72 (1991). 
 59. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).  
 60. Raymond Deneckere et al., Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as 
Destructive Competition, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 619, 619, 625, 634 (1997) (finding both producer and 
consumer surplus can be higher in RPM schemes than in market-clearing scenarios); Benjamin 
Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free Riding, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 471–81 
(2009) (stating RPM may frequently have procompetitive effects); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. 
Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 280 (1988) 
(positing that RPM functions not as nonprice competition between retailers but as a way to ensure 
retailers perform contractual obligations); Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: 
Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 59–62, 92 (1994) (arguing economic theory 
cannot support a per se ban on RPM); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price 
Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 347–49 (1984) (explaining 
anticompetitive motives do not necessarily account for RPM behavior); Richard E. Romano, Double 
Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance, 25 RAND J. ECON. 455, 464 (1994) (“the optimal contract 
generally entails [RPM]”); Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 
347, 351 (1950) (finding “[v]ertical integration . . . does not necessarily suppress competition”); 
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 104–05 (1960) 
(finding manufacturers may have reason to support RPM because it may decrease competitive 
pressures); Sebastian van Baal & Christian Dach, Free Riding and Customer Retention Across Retailers’ 
Channels, 19 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 75, 75 (2005) (finding more than 20% of consumers are 
free riders); Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition, 108 Q.J. ECON. 61, 
61–63 (1993) (finding no one theory fully explains RPM behavior). 
 61. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 340–47 (1991) 
(describing a conspiracy among distributors that explained the use of RPM in the Dr. Miles case); 
see also Telser, supra note 60, at 96–99 (explaining manufacturer cartel motivation for RPM).  
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RPM program is not evidence of a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy among 
manufacturers or among distributors. 
2. Promotional Uses of RPM 
Several procompetitive motives have been offered for RPM.62 The most 
prominent example involves product-specific services that must be provided 
by the distributor. The product-specific services often increase the quality of 
the physical product and thereby make the product more valuable to the 
buyer. For complicated consumer products, thorough instructions on the 
product’s features and its proper use raise the quality of what the consumer 
purchases. Agricultural chemicals are more valuable with technical advice. 
Portland cement is more valuable to masonry contractors and ready-mix 
concrete dealers with technical support. In a very real sense, the quality of the 
physical product is enhanced by the addition of these complementary 
services. These increases in quality will tend to shift the demand function 
rightward. The increase in demand will increase the supplier’s profits, but it 
may also improve consumer welfare even though the price rises. Under other 
circumstances, however, it will not increase consumer welfare and may even 
reduce social welfare. 
Figure 5 illustrates the quality and demand function shift. D1 represents 
final good demand without the quality-enhancing services and the supply is 
represented by S1. In the absence of the quality-enhancing services provided 
by the distributors, the equilibrium price and quantity will be P1 and Q1, 
respectively. Now, suppose that the manufacturer wants its distributors to 
provide quality-enhancing services that increase the demand for its product. 
For many consumers, the services increase the value of the product. Because 
the value of the product increases when these quality-enhancing services are 
performed, the demand shifts from D1 to D2.63 These services are costly and, 
therefore, the supply curve will shift from S1 to S2 to reflect the increased cost. 
The new equilibrium is P2 and Q2. In this case, the services not only lead to an 
increase in price from P1 to P2, but quantity also increases from Q1 to Q2 
because the vertical shift in demand exceeded the vertical shift in supply.64 
 
 62. See, e.g., Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 60 (examining the role of RPM in protecting 
the investment of retailers that certify the quality of the products they carry); see also Romano, 
supra note 60, at 460–62 (highlighting that RPM is a means of correcting an incentive alignment 
problem); Telser, supra note 60, at 89–96 (discussing the product-specific services theory of 
RPM); George R. Ackert, Note, An Argument for Exempting Prestige Goods from the Per Se Ban on Resale 
Price Maintenance, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1199–203 (1995) (arguing that the prestige associated 
with prestige goods stems at least in part from their price and that prestige can be lost through 
discounting, as consumers would begin to think of those goods as ordinary).  
 63. In Figure 5, we assume that D2 is parallel to D1, which means that every consumer places 
an equal value on the quality enhancing services. This, of course, may not be accurate; we deal 
with that possibility below. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.  
 64. If this were not the case, the manufacturer would not push the quality-enhancing 
services because it would not be profitable to do so. The derived demand for the product by the 
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In this case, consumer surplus is unambiguously enhanced. Without the 
quality enhancing services, consumer surplus is represented by the triangular 
area cdP1. With those quality-enhancing services, however, consumer surplus 
rises to area abP2. This is clearly larger, and always will be, as long as the shift 
in demand is parallel and it results in a quantity increase.65 In this context, 
RPM is used in a way that improves both consumer welfare and the 
manufacturer’s profits. This use of RPM would be lawful under a rule of 
reason analysis regardless of whether the court is pursuing consumer welfare 
or social welfare. 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dealers would fall rather than rise and the manufacturer’s profits would suffer. F.M. SCHERER & 
DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 541–48 (3d ed. 
1990). F.M. Scherer and David Ross point out that such services will be expanded until no further 
gains exist. At this point, the increased cost of additional services will be precisely equal to the 
increased value of the product resulting from the increased services. Id. at 543–44.  
 65. Triangles abP2 and cdP1 are similar because the corresponding angles are equal. Since 
the base of abP2 is larger than the base of cdP1, the area of the former must be larger than that of 
the latter. This will always be the case with a parallel shift in demand.  
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All consumers, however, may not value the services equally.66 In our economic 
model, this means that the shift in demand will not be parallel. In Figure 6, 
the services lead to a rotation of demand from D1 to D2. In this case, consumer 
surplus without the service is equal to area acP1 and with the service it is equal 
to area abP2. In some cases, like the one depicted in Figure 6, consumer 
surplus will decline even though RPM is being used to protect quality-
enhancing services. In other cases, however, it will increase.67 Thus, the 
impact on consumer welfare is ambiguous on a priori grounds. As a result, 
the effect of RPM on consumer surplus is an empirical matter. For all practical 
purposes, however, estimating the effect of RPM on consumer surplus while 
controlling for all other influences is a daunting econometric challenge. This 
is, however, a challenge that can be undertaken, and courts do exactly this in 
a full rule of reason analysis.68 The ability of courts to undertake an analysis 
involving quality-for-conduct suggests that a similar approach is possible in 
the merger context. 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 66. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New 
Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 990–92 (1985); F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical 
Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 695–96 (1983).  
 67. As a result, the appropriate antitrust policy is unclear. See Roger D. Blair & James M. 
Fesmire, The Resale Price Maintenance Policy Dilemma, 60 S. ECON. J. 1043, 1043–44 (1994). Judge 
Richard Posner does not believe that this refinement can be handled in a judicial setting and, 
therefore, should be ignored. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 176 (2d ed. 2001). Judge 
Posner may be right as a practical matter, but ignoring this refinement necessarily abandons the 
consumer welfare standard.  
 68. Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 
1265, 1363–64 (discussing the way courts apply rule of reason analysis); Michael A. Carrier, The 
Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) 
(discussing the factors courts consider in rule of reason suits). 
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In Figures 5 and 6, all of the corresponding prices and quantities are equal. 
As a result, RPM can lead to identical price and quantity increases, but 
different outcomes for consumer surplus. In Figure 5, RPM is reasonable, 
because both consumer welfare and social welfare increase due to RPM which 
makes the RPM presumably lawful. In contrast, the RPM plan depicted in 
Figure 6 is unreasonable in the sense that consumer surplus declines, but may 
not be unreasonable on social welfare grounds. It is clear that neither an 
output test nor a price test provides an answer to the question of whether a 
merger is reasonable. RPM is supposed to lead to higher prices—however, 
higher prices alone do not tell us what happens to welfare. As the results in 
Figures 5 and 6 show, somewhat surprisingly, an output test also fails to 
distinguish the effects on consumer welfare. Thus, the parties must embark 
on a difficult econometric journey to resolve the reasonableness inquiry. 
Whichever party bears the burden of proof will likely lose the battle.69 
3. Tying 
Franchising provides an example in which courts have understood the 
quality dimension of competition. This should be instructive for agency 
analysis and for courts in cases involving quality competition in the merger 
context. 
Franchising is pervasive in the U.S. economy.70 It is a contractual form of 
vertical integration in which the franchisor depends upon independently 
owned and operated franchises to carry out downstream production and 
distribution. A hallmark of successful franchise chains is uniformity across 
locations. Quality uniformity is vital because we live in a mobile society. As 
consumers move from one location to another, they encounter significant 
search costs. These search costs are reduced by familiar trademarks and 
uniform quality. There is a reason why local residents in Gainesville, Florida, 
go to Burrito Brothers71 while visitors frequent Chipotle or Taco Bell. 
Irrespective of the quality level, consumers expect not to be disappointed 
when they visit Chipotle or Taco Bell. 
An individual franchisee has an incentive to cut quality in order to reduce 
costs and thereby improve its profits. Consumers continue to be attracted to 
that location by the higher quality experience that they have enjoyed at other 
locations. Disappointment in the quality-cutting franchisee’s location has a 
spillover effect on the rest of the chain. A dry hamburger at McDonald’s with 
 
 69. Moving to the merger context, the appropriate burdens of proof in mergers are beyond 
the scope of this Essay, but certainly the burdens of proof in merger analysis impact case outcomes. 
For a recent example, see In re Ardagh Grp. S.A., No. 131-0087, at 4–8 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2014) 
(Wright, Comm’r, dissenting), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_ 
statements/568821/140411ardaghstmt.pdf. 
 70. For an extensive examination of franchising, see generally ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE 
LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING (2005). 
 71. At least we do. 
A4_BLAIR & SOKOL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2015  7:19 AM 
1990 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1969 
low-quality condiments in one location raises doubts in the consumer’s mind 
regarding what to expect in other locations. Since there are alternative chains, 
consumers can switch. Thus, quality reductions at one franchised outlet can 
have an adverse effect on the chain and, therefore, on the franchisor.72 One 
solution to this problem is to tie input purchases to the franchise license.73 
A tying contract is a vertical restraint that involves a conditional sale. In 
its simplest form, the producer of product A agrees to sell that product, but 
only on the condition that the buyer also purchase product B. In this scenario, 
product A is the tying good while product B is the tied good. The situation can 
be more complicated. For example, there may be a collection of tied goods 
rather than just one. Moreover, tying may involve services and other 
intangibles. It may also extend to leases as well as sales. Finally, the tying 
arrangement may involve third parties, i.e., the buyer of A may have to buy 
the tied good B from a designated third party rather than from the seller of 
A. In all of these scenarios, however, the essence of tying is the condition that 
limits the buyer’s freedom to purchase the tied good(s) where he deems 
optimal from his own perspective. 
In the franchising context, the alleged tying good is usually the franchise 
license, which is normally subject to intellectual property protection. The tied 
goods may be other goods that are resold with little modification or they may 
be inputs into the production of a final good. An example of the former would 
be branded products such as Baskin-Robbins ice cream or Shell gasoline. The 
Baskin-Robbins franchisor licenses its franchisee on the condition that it buy 
Baskin-Robbins ice cream for resale.74 Business format franchisors, such as 
Domino’s Pizza, provide an example of the latter as they may license their 
franchisees on the condition that they buy certain inputs from the franchisor 
or a designated supplier. Domino’s, for example, may require that its 
franchisees buy pizza dough and perhaps other ingredients necessary for a 
“real” Domino’s pizza from Domino’s or from a designated third party.75 
Through the judicious use of a tying contract, the franchisor can induce 
the same input usage and the same final output that would result under 
ownership integration.76 To the extent that this benefits the franchisor at the 
 
 72. For an analytical development of this problem, see generally Roger D. Blair & David L. 
Kaserman, A Note on Incentive Incompatibility Under Franchising, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 323 (1994).  
 73. On the law and economics of tying, see generally Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS 329 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).  
 74. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 75. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 76. For proof of this proposition, see generally Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Vertical 
Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1978). 
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franchisee’s expense, there is apt to be conflict that may erupt in an antitrust 
suit.77 
Tying raises two antitrust concerns. First, buyers are allegedly coerced 
into purchasing the tied good(s) when they would prefer to buy from 
someone else. Thus, consumers are denied choice. Second, to the extent that 
buyers purchase the tied good(s) from the franchisor, they do not buy from 
rival suppliers of the tied good(s). Thus, tying appears to foreclose rivals, 
which permits the franchisor to overcharge its franchisees. 
When tying is used to prevent opportunistic quality degradation, the 
practice should be treated as benign. The franchisor has no incentive to raise 
quality standards that are inconsistent with profit maximization. Thus, the 
level of quality selection will be found where the marginal return of enhanced 
quality is just equal to the marginal cost of enhanced quality. 
The franchisor’s use of tying arrangements is not an effort to leverage 
monopoly into the tied good market(s). Since there are some 2800 
franchising opportunities in the United States,78 it is doubtful that any 
franchisor has monopoly power in the franchise license market. 
The franchisor is using the tying arrangement to “coerce” the franchisee, 
but the coercion is aimed at preventing quality degradation, which is not 
anticompetitive. Courts seem comfortable to address these quality concerns 
in the franchising context. Thus, it is not taxing of the courts (let alone 
antitrust agencies) to undertake the same sort of analysis for quality-
enhancing efficiencies in the merger context. 
III. HOW TO TREAT QUALITY-ENHANCING EFFICIENCIES IN MERGERS 
There are not many empirical papers on the relation between market 
competition including mergers and health care quality.79 We summarize the 
existing academic literature on quality in health care to demonstrate that 
enough research and best practices as to methods exists for the antitrust 
agencies to be guided in quantitative quality empirical measurements just as 
they are based on price-related measurements. 
Ryan Mutter, Patrick Romano, and Herbert Wong broadly surveyed 
hospital mergers in 1999 and 2000 on 25 measurements of quality and had 
mixed results regarding consolidation and quality.80 In contrast, Alison 
 
 77. In most instances, the franchisee is the plaintiff in a franchise tying suit. But a tying 
arrangement arguably forecloses rival suppliers of the tied goods. These foreclosed rivals may 
also file suit.  
 78. Franchises A–Z, FRANCHISING.COM, http://www.franchising.com/franchises (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2015). 
 79. Theoretical models suggest ambiguity regarding competition and quality of care. See 
generally David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets, in 
1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1093 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). 
 80. Ryan L. Mutter et al., The Effects of US Hospital Consolidations on Hospital Quality, 18 INT’L 
J. ECON. BUS. 109, 109 (2011). 
A4_BLAIR & SOKOL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2015  7:19 AM 
1992 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1969 
Cuellar and Paul Gertler found that the creation of hospital systems has 
increased market power rather than improved quality of care.81 They 
examined “patient-level annual hospital discharge data” to determine this.82  
Patrick Romano and David Balan analyzed quality from short-term inpatient 
quality indicators, patient safety indicators and “measures of risk-adjusted 
mortality for heart attack patients, neonatal mortality, and obstetric trauma” 
in the Evanston–Highland Park merger.83 They found little evidence that the 
merger improved quality.84 
Some scholarship shows an inverse relationship between quality and 
consolidation. Vivian Ho and Barton Hamilton examine the effect on the 
quality of care before and after hospital mergers in California, by examining 
hospital inpatient mortality for heart attack and stroke patients along with 
patient readmission rates. They find no merger effects on inpatient mortality 
but found negative effects post-merger regarding readmission rates.85 Daniel 
Kessler and Mark McClellan look at similar quality-of-care indicators for acute-
myocardial-infarction (“AMI”) patients across a range of hospitals.86 They find 
that competition after 1990 improved quality of care.87 AMI and pneumonia 
are the focus of a paper by Gautam Gowrisankaran and Robert Town.88 In 
their analysis, HMO patients (but not Medicare patients) had better outcomes 
with competition.89 Other papers include one from Daniel Kessler and Jeffrey 
Geppert, who examine heart attack care and find that increased competition 
increases welfare.90 Nazmi Sari’s analysis shows that competition improved 
quality regarding wound infections.91 Yet, Robert Huckman analyzes 
consolidation’s effects on cardiac procedures and finds little impact in 
quality.92 
 
 81. Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, How the Expansion of Hospital Systems Has Affected 
Consumers, 24 HEALTH AFF. 213, 217 (2005). 
 82. Id. at 214. 
 83. Patrick S. Romano & David J. Balan, A Retrospective Analysis of the Clinical Quality Effects of 
the Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 
45, 50 (2011). 
 84. Id. at 61. 
 85. Vivian Ho & Barton H. Hamilton, Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions: Does Market 
Consolidation Harm Patients?, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 767, 768–69, 787–88 (2000). 
 86. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?, 115 Q.J. 
ECON. 577, 594–600 (2000). 
 87. Id. at 601–02. 
 88. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Robert J. Town, Competition, Payers, and Hospital Quality, 38 
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1403 (2003). 
 89. Id. at 1417. 
 90. See generally Daniel P. Kessler & Jeffrey J. Geppert, The Effects of Competition on Variation 
in the Quality and Cost of Medical Care, 14 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 575 (2005). 
 91. Nazmi Sari, Do Competition and Managed Care Improve Quality?, 11 HEALTH ECON. 571, 
580–81 (2002). 
 92. Robert S. Huckman, Hospital Integration and Vertical Consolidation: An Analysis of 
Acquisitions in New York State, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 58, 77 (2006). 
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Quality competition hospital papers also include vertical consolidation 
and managerial ability. Given the recent St. Luke’s litigation between a 
hospital and a physician group, we also note an emerging literature involving 
mergers between hospitals and physician groups.93 Finally, managerial quality 
may be impacted by competition.94 
Based on these articles, the impact of competition and consolidation on 
hospital quality in the United States is not always clear. This could be due to 
the proxy variables including inpatient mortality, re-admission, discharge, and 
others that scholars used to measure the quality and/or due to highly stylized 
facts based on specific markets. Our point in this literature review is simply to 
establish that it is possible to quantify quality concerns and that quantification, 
rather than the current preference at the agencies for storytelling, should 
guide quality-enhancing efficiency analysis before the agencies and courts. 
The empirical work to date begs a more general question: What then 
should the appropriate quality measurements be? Health administration uses 
many quality measurements. Perhaps the best known is the “structure-process-
outcome approach.”95 One common approach is to address adjusted 
mortality, in part because this data is easy to obtain.96 Using such an approach 
is not always easy, as there may be high quality in one area but not in other 
areas. Nevertheless, there is emerging empirical literature in this area.97 Such 
a literature suggests that it is possible for agencies and courts to utilize 
credible quality measurements. 
Quality measures are now so common that the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation maintains a directory which potential patients can use to find 
high-quality health care across the country.98 There are also international-
based qualities of care measurements. The Organisation for Economic Co-
 
 93. See generally Caroline S. Carlin et al., Changes in Quality of Health Care Delivery After Vertical 
Integration, 50 HEALTH SERVICES RES. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://onlinelibrary. 
wiley.com/doi/10.111/1475-6773.12274/pdf; Wenke Hwang et al., Effects of Integrated Delivery 
System on Cost and Quality, 19 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e175 (2013) (providing a literature review). 
 94. Nicholas Bloom et al., The Impact of Competition on Management Quality: Evidence from 
Public Hospitals 3–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16,032, 2010), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16032.pdf. 
 95. See Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care, 44 MILBANK MEMORIAL 
FUND Q. 166, 188–89 (1966); Avedis Donabedian, The Quality of Care: How Can It Be Assessed?, 
260 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1743, 1745–46 (1988). 
 96. See, e.g., Adam J. Gadzinski et al., Utilization and Outcomes of Inpatient Surgical Care at 
Critical Access Hospitals in the United States, 148 J. AM. MED. ASS’N SURGERY 589, 591–93 (2013); 
Karen E. Joynt et al., Quality of Care and Patient Outcomes in Critical Access Rural Hospitals, 306 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 45, 45, 48 (2011). 
 97. Patrick S. Romano & Ryan Mutter, The Evolving Science of Quality Measurement for 
Hospitals: Implications for Studies of Competition and Consolidation, 4 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & 
ECON. 131, 132 (2004) (analyzing and reviewing the literature in this area). 
 98. Comparing Health Care Quality: A National Directory, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., 
http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2013/09/national-directory.html 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
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operation and Development (“OECD”) and the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) also have measurements based on “best practices.”99 
Quality-based quantitative measurements are in fact part of daily life for 
many hospitals, and these measurements are a function of Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) service quality measures. The CMS 
is an effort by the Government “to link Medicare’s payment system to a value-
based system to improve healthcare quality.”100 One of CMS’s programs is a 
Medicare Hospital Value Based Purchasing (“VBP”) Program101 and the 
second is a non-payment policy for conditions that are acquired in 
hospitals.102 These programs have shifted hospital reimbursement schemes to 
quality outcome-based pay for performance.103 Under VBP, the government 
reimburses based on processes of care (13 measurements), patient 
experiences (one measurement) and outcomes (three mortality 
measurements) based on a total performance score.104 
A number of more recent academic studies measure quality competition, 
such as in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, where competition is 
 
 99. CHARLES SHAW, WORLD HEALTH ORG. EUR., HOW CAN HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE BE 
MEASURED AND MONITORED? 5 (2003), available at http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_ 
file/0009/74718/E82975.pdf?ua=1; Edward Kelley & Jeremy Hurst, Health Care Quality Indicators 
Project Conceptual Framework Paper 27–28 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Health Working 
Paper No. 23, 2006), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/440134737301.  
 100. Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https:// 
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/hospital-value-based-
purchasing/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 101. Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care 
Hospitals and the Long Term Care; Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 2014 
Rates; Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers; Hospital Conditions of 
Participation; Payment Policies Related to Patient Status; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496, 50,678 
(Aug. 19, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 412–414, 419, 424, 482, 485, 489) [hereinafter 
Payment Systems]. Proposed rules would add four additional quality-based measurements: 
influenza immunization, influenza vaccination coverage among health care personnel, tobacco 
use screening, and tobacco use treatment. Medicare Program; Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities 
Prospective Payment System—Update for Fiscal Year Beginning October 1, 2014 (FY 2015); Final 
Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,938, 45,940, 45,967–72 (Aug. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
412); Medicare Program; Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities Prospective Payment System—Update 
for Fiscal Year Beginning October 1, 2014 (FY 2015); Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 26,040, 
26,065–68 (May 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412). 
 102. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems 
and Fiscal Year 2008 Rates; Final Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130, 47,200 (Aug. 22, 2007) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. 411, 412, 413, 489); DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.: CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HOSPITAL-ACQUIRED CONDITIONS AND PRESENT ON ADMISSION 
INDICATOR REPORTING PROVISION 6 (2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-
Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/wPOAFactSheet.pdf. 
 103. For similar state-level quality measurements, see generally Sule Calikoglu et al., Hospital 
Pay-for-Performance Programs in Maryland Produced Strong Results, Including Reduced Hospital-Acquired 
Conditions, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2649 (2012). 
 104. Payment Systems, supra note 101, at 50,678–80. 
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based on quality and not on cost.105 Quality includes measurements of 
hospital mortality106 and mortality within 30 days of admission.107 These 
empirical studies are highly relevant to U.S. antitrust analysis as hospital and 
physician services are sold in price-controlled markets (Medicare and 
Medicaid), so the usual monopoly markups in competitive hospital markets 
do not apply. Furthermore, the case that competition is related to better 
quality may be stronger in price-controlled markets than in markets where 
providers can set prices. 
Reviews of the more recent hospital merger cases have not led to more 
comprehensive guidance as to a robust analytical approach. The FTC seems 
to take an alternative approach by not suggesting a hierarchy of better 
measures of quality of care. Rather, the FTC states: “we advocate relying on 
the merging parties’ analyses to determine which metrics to consider, and 
what the merger’s likely impact on those measures will be.”108 On the one 
hand, these measures of quality would be the ones that the merging parties 
use regularly, as per the 2010 Merger Guidelines. If there are real efficiency 
gains, then such analyses should play a prominent role in merger competitive-
effects analysis. However, this approach also allows the parties to set the stage 
by cherry-picking the best quality measures rather than the ones that might 
be most accurate. Parties may be able to demonstrate likely quality 
improvements in area A, and then ignore analyses of areas B and C, and the 
agencies will have to demonstrate that potential offsetting reductions in B and 
C outweigh A. Updating the Commentary on the Merger Guidelines to 
include a more robust discussion of quality efficiencies including the types of 
quality data (e.g., customer satisfaction survey data, outcome-based 
measurements) and more closing statements that specifically detail the types 
of quality measurements used would go a long way to improving business 
planning and improving consumer welfare. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Essay reflects concern that antitrust agencies and courts have not 
embraced quality-enhancing efficiencies and offered them equal weight as 
cost efficiencies in case law and policy. With a better sense of the kind of 
quality evidence to use and how to apply it, courts should not automatically 
 
 105.  Hugh Gravelle et al., Hospital Quality Competition Under Fixed Prices, 2–15 (Univ. of York 
Ctr. for Health Econs., Research Paper No. 80, 2012), available at http://www.york.ac.uk/media/ 
che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHERP80_hospital_quality_competition_fixedprices.
pdf (providing a literature review).  
 106. Zack Cooper et al., Does Hospital Competition Save Lives? Evidence from the English NHS 
Patient Choice Reforms, 121 ECON. J. F228, F229 (2011); Carol Propper et al., Competition and 
Quality: Evidence from the NHS Internal Market 1991–9, 118 ECON. J. 138, 139 (2008). 
 107. Martin Gaynor et al., Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition, and Patient Outcomes in 
the National Health Service, 5 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 134, 136 (2013). 
 108. See Perry & Cunningham, supra note 15, at 44. 
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defer to the government as to merger effects on quality. Rather, courts should 
treat quality arguments akin to price arguments in merger cases with regard 
to merger efficiencies, with the same weight based on an economically sound 
empirical analysis. Doing so would improve both total and consumer welfare, 
particularly in markets such as health care where fundamental structural 
changes are underway. 
 
